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Abstract 
 
The rise of digital platforms through which labour is bought and sold is transforming the world 
of work and challenging the existing regulatory regimes that govern it. Depending on one’s point 
of view, Uber has become the poster child or bête noir of this transformation, challenging 
traditional taxi regulation and labour and employment law.   Technological utopians celebrate 
the transformation of traditional workers into micro-entrepreneurs, free to work whenever and 
for as long as they want in proportion to their preferences for income and leisure, while critics 
see a degradation of the standard employment relation and higher levels of precariousness and 
labour market vulnerability.  However, with few exceptions, most discussions of Uber fail to put 
it into historical perspective and in particular do not examine the history of taxi cab capitalism 
and its underlying relations of production.  Using Toronto, Canada as a case study, this study 
explores the shifting modes of capitalism that have existed over the motorized taxi industry’s 
100 year history, focusing on the impact and interaction of technological change, changing legal 
regulation and worker resistance in driving these changes.  Viewed from this perspective, the 
Uber challenge to prior regimes of taxi capitalism is less a matter of technological innovation 
than a bold challenge to the law and its future is likely to be determined by the effectiveness of 
worker and taxi industry resistance. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From a neo-liberal economic perspective the emergence of new digital technologies portends the 
possibility of an economic revolution in which there will be greater human freedom and a 
democratization of economic opportunity.  Digitally enabled workers will transform themselves 
into micro-entrepreneurs, able to work for themselves “whenever they want from any location 
and at whatever level of intensity needed to achieve their desired standard of living.”1  Of course, 
there is also recognition that this bright future is not preordained by technology alone.  Even for 
the most technological utopian, human liberation is not merely an app away and there is 
recognition that other institutional and policy changes are required for the emancipatory 
potential of the platform economy to be unlocked.2  But it is seen as possible within what Arun 
Sundararajan, a leading sharing economy optimist, calls “crowd-based capitalism.”3 
For others, the impact of the platform economy is much darker.  The title of Steven Hill’s book 
succinctly encapsulates this perspective, Raw Deal: How the “Uber Economy” and Runaway 
Capitalism are Screwing American Workers.4  Here the emphasis is on the ways in which these 
platforms are shifting uncertainty and risks onto workers who lack employment security and 
face a shredded safety net in hyper-competitive, globalized labour markets.   
 
On the surface there seems to be a common agreement that capitalism is central to 
understanding the operation of the platform economy and its implications for the workforce, yet 
neither Sundararajan nor Hill actually make capitalism and the social relations of production 
central to their analytic framework.  Thus one goal of this paper is, to put capitalism at the 
centre of the analysis, drawing on Nick Srnicek’s recent book, Platform Capitalism.5  In doing 
so, there is a need to recognize that capitalism is not a static system operating uniformly over 
time and space, but rather takes very different forms.  The variety of capitalisms debate draws 
on this insight, but focusses on the political framework within which capitalism functions and 
the extent to which it is embedded in particular institutional arrangements.6  The concern here 
is more focused on the inner workings of capitalist regimes of accumulation.  In particular, this 
                                                        
1 Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based 
Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016) at 176.  For a schematic overview of the conventional, neo-
liberal perspective, see Frank Pasquale, “Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism” (2016) 35 Yale Law & 
Policy Review 309. 
2 Juliet Schor, “Debating the Sharing Economy” (October 2014) Great Transition Initiative, online: 
<http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf
> (“[b]ut technologies are only as good as the political and social context in which they are employed. 
Software, crowdsourcing, and the information commons give us powerful tools for building social 
solidarity, democracy, and sustainability. Now our task is to build a movement to harness that power” at 
12).  
3 Sundararajan, supra note 2.  
4 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015).  Also, see Tom Slee, What’s Yours is Mine: Against the Sharing 
Economy (New York: OR Books, 2015), especially ch 4 & 5; Trebor Scholz, Uberworked and Underpaid: 
How American Workers are Disrupting the Digital Economy (New York: Polity, 2017). 
5 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). 
6 Peter A Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  For a critique, see Wolfgang Streeck, Re-forming 
Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), especially ch 12. 
chapter inquires into and seeks to account for the distinct ways that workers are subsumed into 
platform capitalism.   
 
A second goal is to use this refined political economy framework to place Uber and the taxi 
industry in historical perspective.  As we shall see, taxi capitalism has been made, unmade and 
remade several times over the past hundred years in response to changing technology and law, 
and resistance to these changes by workers and segments of capital which shape both law and 
technology.  Using Toronto as a case study, the rise of Uber based on its platform technology is 
examined as part of the broader history of taxi capitalism. 
   
Theoretical Starting Points 
 
Although Sundararajan titled his book The Sharing Economy he recognizes this is a misnomer 
since there is actually very little sharing that takes place in the world of the platform economy.7  
Rather, the so-called sharing economy is dominated by technologically facilitated commercial 
exchanges and in recognition of this reality Sundararajan’s preferred term is “crowd-based 
capitalism.”  As explained earlier, I prefer the term “platform capitalism”, but regardless of the 
adjective used to describe the kind of capitalism that exists, it is important in the first instance 
not to lose sight of the analytical significance of its capitalist character.  In particular, the 
platform economy is fueled by wealthy venture capitalists seeking to increase their private 
fortunes by finding new ways of extracting value from socially produced wealth.  Platforms are 
digital infrastructures that enable individuals and groups to interact and are thus 
intermediaries.  What makes them capitalist is that these infrastructures are privately owned 
and operated to extract profits by becoming the ground on which transactions take place.  Users  
must pay quasi-monopoly rents to access the platform while the platform itself is uniquely 
positioned to collect data provided by its users, which is then commodified and sold to other 
profit-seeking businesses.8   
 
The identification of the platform as a vehicle for capitalist accumulation, however, only begins 
the analysis and here is where the adjectives come in.  What kind of capitalism is produced by 
the platform?  A good place to begin this discussion is with Sundararajan’s sub-title, The End of 
Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism.  This juxtaposition might seem 
paradoxical at first glance, since capitalism has long been associated with the primacy of waged 
work as the mechanism through which capitalists extract surplus value from labour.  But 
Sundararajan is not a Marxist and neither sees his claim as paradoxical or requiring an 
explanation of what makes crowd-based capitalism capitalist.  However, he does describe the 
elements of crowd-based capitalism as being market-based, providing greater opportunities to 
more fully deploy assets, and to source labour and capital from decentralized crowds. He also 
describes its as blurring the lines between the personal and professional by commercializing 
activities that used to be considered personal, and blurring the lines between fully employed and 
                                                        
7 Sundararajan, supra note 2 at 27.  Indeed, the growth of the platform economy may be tilting the 
balance away from de-commodified altruistic or communal interactions.  See, Orly Lobel, “The Law of the 
Platform” (2016) 101:1 Minn L Rev 87 at 109.   
8 For a more detailed and nuanced account, see Srnicek, supra note 6 at ch 2.   
casual labour, between independent and dependent employment and between work and 
leisure.9   
 
This combination of characteristics seems to describe a decentralized market economy in which 
the lifeworld is pervasively commodified and in which labour is seemingly provided on a spot 
market finely tuned to meet ever shifting demand.  What is missing, however, are several 
structural features of capitalism that differentiate it from a simple trading economy.  First, there 
is no recognition that underlying capitalism is a particular structure of property and class 
relations in which the means of production are substantially owned by a small minority of the 
population while the majority are dependent on their labour in order to survive.10  Second, there 
is no recognition that capitalism is driven by the relentless drive for profits and expansion.  
Economic value in capitalism is not generated by simple exchange but in the ability of capital to 
extract profits from socially produced wealth through relations of domination and exploitation.  
If crowd-based capitalism was a world in which the predominant social relation of production 
was between relatively equal, truly independent, property owning commodity and service 
producers, it would not be capitalist because it would not have a capitalist property and class 
structure.11    
 
We will return to a discussion of Uber later, but the evidence seems pretty clear that the 
predominant structure of the platform economy does not resemble a world of truly independent 
commodity/service producers selling directly to consumers through platform mediated 
transactions, but rather one in which workers are subordinated to platform enterprises bent on 
maximizing profits and expanding to become dominant players, if not monopolists, in their 
markets.  For example, leaving open the question of whether Uber drivers are legally employees 
or not, what is clear is that they are not economically independent in any meaningful way but 
rather exist in a subordinate relation with Uber, a privately held company with a valuation 
estimated to be over $60 billion.  This is the underlying reality that motivates Uber drivers to act 
collectively to redress what they perceive to be their domination and exploitation in that 
relation.12   
 
So even if Sundararajan does not satisfactorily explain how capitalism works in the platform 
economy, the question is centrally important, not just theoretically but also practically.  
Platform capitalism fits within a larger political economic transformation that has seen the 
decline of the standard employment relationship central to the post-World War II era of welfare 
state capitalism and the growth of precarious work, including own-account self-employment 
and temporary work, associated with the rise of neo-liberal capitalist formations.13   
                                                        
9 Sundararajan, supra note 2 at 27. 
10 Erik Olin Wright, Understanding Class (New York: Verso, 2015).   
11 Nick Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex (London: Pluto, 2015) 
(“[s]ince the discovery of the microchip, promoters of the information revolution have argued that it 
dissolves class” at 9).   
12 See e.g., Hill, supra note 5, ch 3; Slee, supra note 5, ch 4. 
13 For a useful overview of and explanation for the rise and decline of the standard employment relation, 
see Judy Fudge, “The Future of the Standard Employment Relationship: Labour Law, New Institutional 
Economics and Old Power Resource Theory” (2017) Journal of Industrial Relations (forthcoming). On 
precarious employment, see Gerry & Janine Rogers, eds, Precarious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation 
 
This is not to deny that technological change plays a significant role in the evolution of 
capitalism.  Marx was acutely attentive to the “constant revolutionizing of the instruments of 
production” that was endemic to capitalism, but he did not consider technology in isolation.  
Rather, he was concerned with the way that technology revolutionized “relations of production 
and with them the whole relations of society.”14  It was the first industrial revolution that was 
Marx’s primary focus and in Capital  he famously described the process by which capitalist 
relations of production supplanted simple commodity production by freeing workers from 
ownership of the means of production making them ‘free’ to sell their labour as rights-bearing 
individuals to the equally rights bearing owners of capital.  He then followed these personae into 
the factory – the hidden abode of production – where the capitalist, having purchased the 
workers’ capacity to work, extracted surplus value by his control over the labour process.  Thus 
the wage relation came to be seen as the paradigmatic mode of labour exploitation in Marxist 
theory.  
 
However, as Wallace Clement reminds us, pockets of commodity production continued in areas 
such as fishing and farming, so the process of proletarianization was never complete.15  But even 
where simple commodity production continued, it was not hived off from the capitalist 
economy, but rather became linked to it in various ways that also produced economic 
domination and exploitation.  For example, commodity producers retained possession and 
formal ownership of the means of production but once market exchange ceased to be 
predominantly within integrated local economies, they increasingly became tied to and 
dependent upon capitalist firms to acquire necessary inputs (including financing) and to 
transport, store and sell the outputs of commodity production.  As a result, capital gained real 
economic control over commodity producers and with that the ability to extract surplus from 
their efforts.  Indeed, as Jairus Banaji has demonstrated historically, capitalism is compatible 
with a wide variety of modes of labour exploitation which may co-exist at any particular 
conjuncture. 16    Moreover, as we shall see in the case of Uber, the lines between 
proletarianization and other modes of labour exploitation, such as petty commodity production, 
are not always clear in social reality, which opens up space to argue about their legal 
characterization as well.   
 
Clement also examined the question of the determinants of the mode of labour exploitation.  
When does capital proletarianize workers from whom they extract surplus value directly or leave 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
(Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1989); Leah Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: 
Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); 
Katherine VW Stone & Harry Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract 
of Employment (New York: Russell Sage, 2013).  On neo-liberal capitalism, see David Harvey, A Brief 
History of Neo-Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
14 Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (1848).  
15 Wallace Clement, Class, Power and Property (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), especially ch 9 & 10.  Also, see 
Clement’s The Struggle to Organize: Resistance in Canada’s Fishery (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1986), especially ch 5. 
16 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).  Also, see Genevieve LeBaron, 
“Unfree Labour Beyond Binaries: Insecurity, Social Hierarchy and Labour Market Restructuring” (2015) 
17:1 International Feminist Journal of Politics 1. 
them as dependent commodity producers from whom they extract surplus value indirectly 
through commercial transactions?  Focusing on farming and fishing, he pointed to the ways 
capital benefited by retaining dependent commodity production, including a reduction in its 
exposure to risks of nature, elimination of the cost of investment in the first stages of 
production, and lower labour supervision costs.17   
 
Clement’s Marxist analysis can be connected with and supplemented by Coase’s theory of the 
firm, which asks when firms will make (i.e., manufacture with its own employees) rather than 
buy. 18  In a world of zero transaction costs there would be no firms and no employment because 
there would be no benefit from managing (which always has a cost) compared to costless 
contracting.  However, in the real world where transaction costs are endemic at some level, 
firms will form and employees will be hired where the costs of making and managing are less 
than the cost of negotiating contracts.  These decisions will be significantly affected by 
technology.  For example, where technological developments allowed productivity to be 
enhanced through capital intensive investments in machinery and a refined division of labour, 
individualized dependent commodity production was replaced by proletarianized social labour 
coordinated by capital in factory settings.  For Marx writing in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the factory was the paradigmatic site of the hidden abode of production 
where the capitalist extracted surplus labour from the proletarianized worker.  Dependent 
commodity production seemed to be destined for the dustbin of history.  As a result, theorizing 
about the social relations of production in dependent commodity production was relatively 
uncommon.        
 
However, the shift from buying to making was never complete and, as Rubery and Wilkinson 
demonstrate, there is no economic law dictating that the movement from dependent commodity 
production to factorization will always be in one direction.  Looking specifically at outwork, they 
identified a number of factors that interact to shape the decision whether to produce in-house or 
outsource.  These include the type of technology available, the potential for fragmenting the 
production process, the role of capital intensive investment, the cost of labour supervision, and 
the avoidance of collective action and legal regulation, among others. 19 
  
David Weil has also approached this issue through his exploration of the phenomenon of 
fissuring, which involves once integrated lead businesses choosing not to make things 
themselves but to shift the production of goods and services outside the firm to smaller 
businesses through outsourcing, franchising and supply chains.  As a result, employment is also 
shifted outside lead firms and into smaller business, which in turn may seek to shift work out to 
so-called independent contractors or “micro-entrepreneurs.”  Technological change is a 
                                                        
17 Clement, Class, Power and Property, supra note 16 at 233. 
18 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4:16 Economica 386.  Also, see Alfred D Chandler, The 
Visible Hand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Bruce E Kaufman, “The Impossibility of a 
Perfectly Competitive Labour Market” (2007) 31:5 Cambridge Journal of Economics 775.  
19 Jill Rubery & Frank Wilkinson, “Outwork and Segmented Labour Markets” in Frank Wilkinson, ed, The 
Dynamics of Labour Market Segmentation (London: Academic Press, 1981) 115 at 120-24.  In a recent 
article, Matt Finkin usefully deployed this framework to explore the broad contours of the use of the  
putting out system and its social relations of production.  See Matthew W Finkin, “Beclouded Work, 
Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective” (2016) 37:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 603. 
significant factor that makes fissuring both feasible and attractive.  “Over the past three decades, 
it has become far less expensive to contract with other organizations – or create new 
organizational forms – to undertake activities that…alter the calculus of what should be done 
inside or outside enterprise boundaries.”20  But again it is important to remember that it is not 
just technology that drives fissuring, but rather it is the drive for profit maximization that leads 
firms to adopt and adapt technology for that purpose. 
 
To the extent that Marxist theory is centred on the paradigm of extracting surplus value through 
employment in the hidden abode of the factory, it now faces the challenge of analyzing the new 
relations of production and modes of labour exploitation that are becoming prominent features 
of twenty-first century capitalist economies.  Various theorists are beginning to take up this task.  
A collection of essays edited by van der Linden and Roth challenges the theoretical centrality of 
proletarianized wage work and calls for an examination of the “extraordinary multiplicity and 
multifacitedness of the constellations of exploitation” that coexist, including self-employment.21  
Steffen Böhm and Chris Land argue that there is a need to prise open new hidden abodes of 
production outside of employment to incorporate new sites of value production.22  Finally, 
Ursula Huws, a pioneer in theorizing the implications of cybernetics for capitalist development, 
has explored the question of how enterprises generate profit in the digital age.  She makes the 
useful distinction between labour that is performed directly for a capitalist employer by a worker 
who is dependent on her or his labour for subsistence (workers who she dubs “inside the knot”- 
the classic proletariat) and groups that she characterizes as being less directly involved in 
capitalist social relations, including people engaged in petty commodity production, trade or 
small scale rent, groups that she says have been given a new lease on life by the Internet.  But 
being less directly involved does not translate into being outside capitalist relations of 
production and so Huws points to the need to specify and analyze these relations, including the 
process of generating profits by rent or trade rather than commodity production.  For example, 
she suggests that online employment agencies and car sharing services may be thought of as 
profiting from rent rather than commodity production, but such a claim requires closer scrutiny 
of the actual relations between these platforms and the workers who use them.  Her larger point, 
however, remains valid; we need to think about the ways capitalism operates “outside the 
knot.”23  
 
The identification of different modes of labour exploitation is the first step, but does not end the 
discussion, because one mode is not necessarily preferable to another.  We must also take the 
next step and explore and assess the extent of domination and exploitation that exists within 
these relations.  A number of factors are likely to be influential, including the extent to which 
laws effectively limit workers’ market vulnerabilities or facilitate (or obstruct) their ability to act 
collectively to protect their interests.  Then, within the spaces available for collective action, 
                                                        
20 David Weil, The Fissured Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) at 44. 
21 Marcel van der Linden & Karl Heinz Roth, “Results and Prospects” in van der Linden and Roth, eds, 
Beyond Marx: Theorising the Global Labour Relations of the Twenty-First Century (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2014) at 479.  In that volume, see Sergio Bologna, “Workerism: An Inside View. From 
Mass-Worker to Self-Employed Labour” at 121. 
22 Steffen Böhm & Chris Land, “The New ‘Hidden Abode’: Reflections on Value and Labour in the New 
Economy” (2012) 60:2 The Sociological Review 217. 
23 Ursual Huws, Labor in the Digital Economy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2014), 162-163. 
there is the question of the forms collective action takes (e.g., unions or cooperatives) and their 
success.  More generally, the broader political economic context sets the conditions within 
which laws are enacted and enforced, collective action occurs and capital exercises power.   
 
With this in mind, we turn to a historical exploration of taxi cab capitalisms and the social 
relations of production that characterized them through a case study of Toronto.   However, one 
final theoretical clarification is necessary.  It may seem odd perhaps to speak of taxi capitalisms 
as if they were distinct forms of capitalism on the same order as say liberal-market capitalism or 
welfare state capitalism.  But that is not the intention.  Rather, the discussion of taxi capitalism 
recognizes that the taxi industry operates within a larger capitalist social formation, but also 
understands that different sectors of capitalist industry are organized according to the 
distinctive technologies, market structures, regulatory arrangements and worker resistances 
they experience.  The historical account that follows aims to elaborate on these distinctive 
features without losing sight of the larger capitalist environment in which they operate.  
 
Taxi Capitalisms Before Uber 
 
Taxi Capitalism 1.0: Standard Capitalism and the Standard Employment Relation 
The history of the taxi cab industry and the impact of technological change logically should 
begin with the horse-drawn trade of the nineteenth century and the impact of the automobile, 
but there is too little Canadian research for this to be feasible, so the chapter begins with the 
motorized taxi trade that began in the second decade of the twentieth century.24  Initially, the 
cost of entry was high.  Motor cars were a luxury item affordable by few and municipal 
regulations required cabs to have special features, which made them more expensive than 
standard cars.  Since cruising the streets looking for fares was not an efficient way of doing 
business, taxis depended on cabstands and telephone dispatch systems.  Cab stands in prime 
locations often operated as private concessions for which hefty fees were charged and telephone 
dispatch required the installation of call boxes around the city where drivers could wait for 
assignments, also requiring a significant investment.  Another cost was taximeters, which were 
favoured by some segments of the public and by some owners as a means to protect themselves 
against petty fraud by drivers. 
 
As a result of the high cost of entry, the trade was initially dominated by larger fleet owners who 
hired drivers as employees in the classic or what I will call ‘standard capitalist’ mode of 
production.25  Yet despite the hopes of early investors that high entry costs would produce an 
oligopolistic industry structure in which quasi-monopoly profits could be extracted, 
independent operators soon found ways into the industry, increasing competition and reducing 
                                                        
24 The only detailed Canadian study is Norman Beattie, “The Cab Trade in Winnipeg, 1871-1910” (1998) 
27:1 Urban History Review 36.  For a brief discussion of the early cab trade in Toronto, see Kimberly 
Berry, “The Independent Servant: A Socio-cultural Examination of the Post-War Toronto Taxi Driver” 
(PhD Dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2006) at 33-43.  Drivers’ unions seem to have been fairly 
common in major cities.  See, Eugene Forsey, Trade Unions in Canada 1812-1902 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982).  
25 Beattie, supra note 25 at 48; Donald F Davis, “The Canadian Taxi Wars, 1925-1950” (1998) 27:1 Urban 
History Review 7 [Davis, “Taxi Wars”] at 7-8. 
profits.  For example, even by 1910 36 automobile dealerships and other companies in Winnipeg 
leased taxis to drivers who competed for business with the taxi fleets.26  The involvement of 
these companies also marked an early attempt by rentiers to profit from the taxi industry by 
selling services to those directly involved in producing taxi services.   
 
The nature of the work also did not favour direct management of a large labour force as there 
was little scope for extracting more surplus value by a refined division of mass labour.  As well, 
because cab drivers worked alone and were geographically dispersed across the city, employers 
had difficulty exercising a high level of managerial control and intensifying the labour process.  
Beyond phone systems, significant economies of scale were simply not available.   
 
Finally, the existing regulatory regime also did not create barriers to entry.  Older municipal 
regulations, dating back to the horse-drawn trade, required licenses, but there was no limit on 
their number and fees were not particularly high.  Rules governed other matters such as fare 
structures and driver behaviour, but none of this strongly favoured large taxi fleets over small 
ones or independent operators.27   
 
For all these reasons, taxi capitalism 1.0 failed to thrive, even without significant collective 
resistance by employee drivers.28 
 
Taxi Capitalism 2.0: Unregulated Petty Commodity/Service Production 
Conditions for fleet owners worsened in the 1920s and 30s as the cost of entering the business 
dropped.  The growth of the mass-production auto industry and the increase in real wages 
during the 1920s made car ownership more affordable and municipalities failed to enforce 
vehicle regulations, effectively allowing less specialized cars to be used as taxis.  Public taxi 
stands in some cities replaced or provided an alternative to private concessions and taxi driver 
and cab owner licenses remained readily available at low cost.  In Toronto, for example, the 
number of taxi drivers’ licenses issued annually increased from 1043 in 1921 to 2009 in 1929, 
while the number of owner licenses issued grew from 541 to 1313 over the same period.  By 1931, 
there was only one fleet with more than 50 licensed cabs and fleets with 10 or more cars 
accounted for only about a third of the trade.  Small fleets with less than 10 cars comprised 
about a quarter of the trade while individual owner-operators made up the other forty percent.29  
Finally, in some cities taxi brokers entered the field, providing a bundle of services to taxi 
owners including advertising, a garage and telephone dispatching, further reducing the 
                                                        
26 Beattie, supra note 25 at 48.  
27 Beattie, supra note 25 at 39-42; Berry, supra note 25 at 37-41. 
28 Canada Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1900-1978) [LG] 
contains sporadic references to taxi driver unionization during this period, mostly from Montreal.  For 
example, see LG (December 1922) at 1261 (application of Montreal taxi drivers for conciliation under the 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act); (August 1923) at 870 (strike by 77 taxi drivers over dismissal of an 
employee); and (June 1924) at 470 (another IDIA application from Montreal drivers).   
29 Report of the Advisory Committee on Taxi Cabs to the Board of Commissioners of Police of the City of 
Toronto (12 April 1931), City of Toronto Archives (Box No 225064, Item 2348) [Advisory Committee on 
Taxi Cabs] at 84-86.  
economies of scale that favoured larger fleets.30  As a result, petty commodity/service 
production came to dominate the industry.31   
 
Taxi Capitalism 3.0: Regulated Petty Commodity Production 
The triumph of petty production, however, did not bring prosperity to its participants.  As one 
observer of the highly competitive cab business in London, England at the turn of the century 
commented, “it is a poor man’s industry”32 and this was the case in Canada too, particularly 
after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, which not only reduced demand for taxi services 
but triggered an increase in the number of operators as unemployed workers tried their hand at 
earning an income by driving a cab.33  Cab fares dropped and operators and drivers struggled to 
make a living.  In Toronto an Advisory Committee on Taxicabs was struck in 1931 and in its 1932 
report found that “the business is badly overcrowded” and the earnings of most drivers 
“meagre.” Although there was some variation between different industry sectors, the report 
found that drivers typically worked about 12 hours a day, six days a week and earned about $17 a 
week, less than the wage of a general labourer.  In Montreal in 1934 it was estimated that both 
drivers and owner-operators of a single cab took home about $13.50 a week.34     
 
The Advisory Committee was also highly critical of the emerging role of rentier capital in the 
industry.  As noted earlier, taxi brokerages were formed to sell taxi owners a bundle of services, 
including dispatch.  They have not been the subject of much research, so there are still 
unanswered questions, but it seems initially some brokerages were created as cooperatives by 
small fleet owners to take advantage of economies of scale.  By the early 1930s, however, most 
brokerages were businesses in their own right, selling services to industry participants who did 
not have an ownership stake in the brokerage.  The Advisory Committee was particularly critical 
of the role of these rentier brokerages, finding “that in a great many cases cab brokers have 
conducted their businesses in an irresponsible manner and largely at the expense of the cab 
owners whom they have induced to subscribe to their service.”  The Committee recommended 
that brokers should be licensed and that licenses should only be issued to persons who were 
licensed cab owners. 35   
 
Another avenue for rentier capitalists to profit from the taxi industry was through cab leasing, a 
phenomenon that first appeared a decade earlier but that expanded in the 1920s.  The Advisory 
Committee explained how it operated.  A private company would buy a number of inexpensive 
cars and would then lease a car to a driver for one year, with payments made daily.  The driver 
purchased fuel from the leasing company and paid for repairs, which were required to be done 
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at the company’s garage.  The company might also provide telephone dispatch services.  If the 
driver lived up to the terms of the contract, title to the car would be transferred at the end of the 
year.  Taxi leasing became more attractive as the Depression deepened because it provided 
unemployed workers without capital an opportunity to get into the business, but the Advisory 
Committee found that they fared poorly.  “As far as financial results are concerned, however, the 
real and only beneficiaries have been the companies disposing of automobiles.”  It proposed to 
eliminate the practice by requiring that all cabs be operated by the owner or a driver employed 
by the owner.  Rentier capitalism was not welcome in the industry, or at the very least the 
limited opportunities to profit from selling services to operators were to be hoarded for industry 
insiders.36 
 
Driver resistance to poor working conditions took a variety of forms.  In a few instances, 
employed drivers tried to unionize, but Canadian labour law during this period did not compel 
employers to recognize and bargain with unions, so it was a tough slog.37  As well, in a depressed 
industry where profits were hard to generate, there were severe limits on what could be gained 
through collective bargaining, although there were some successes.  In 1936 500 Montreal taxi 
drivers, joined by 873 licensed cab owners, struck to secure reduced brokerage fees. The City 
intervened and a committee was created to address the drivers’ and owners’ concerns.38  In 1938 
720 members of the Toronto taxi drivers’ local of the Teamsters struck against 63 taxi 
companies, demanding union recognition, a minimum weekly wage, overtime after ten hours 
and other improvements.  The strike was substantially successful and its terms were extended to 
the entire industry under the Industrial Standards Act.  The following year, the Union struck 
again and made further gains.39 
 
Drivers also worked with local labour councils to protect workers’ interests when municipal taxi 
regulations were being considered.40  However, it was not just taxi drivers who acted 
collectively; the chief players in municipal taxi regulation were associations of taxi owners, 
whose demands included restrictions on entry, rate regulation, mandatory meters, tougher 
vehicle standards and a requirement that brokers be cab owners.  The politics of regulation, 
however, were complicated as different segments of the industry formed into different 
associations to represent their distinct interests.41  There is no detailed account of how the 
politics of taxi regulation unfolded in Toronto after the 1932 report, but like in most North 
American cities restrictions on entry were imposed, fares were regulated and the access of 
rentier capital to the industry was limited.42  
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39 LG (May 1938) at 486-88; (September 1938) at 1047; (August 1939) at 859-60. Berry, supra note 25 at 
71-76. 
40 There were also some efforts directed at obtaining protective provincial legislation.  For example, in 
1931 the Ontario Executive Committee of the Trades and Labour Congress lobbied for an eight hour day 
for drivers of trucks, buses and taxi cabs.  See: LG (February 1931) at 188. 
41 Advisory Committee on Taxi Cabs, supra note 30, contains all these demands and reproduces the 
submissions it received from seven different industry associations. 
42 For a detailed discussion of the development of taxi regulation in Winnipeg during this period, see 
Davis, “Taxi Wars”, supra note 26 at 14-17. 
 
Taxi Capitalism 4.0: Medallion Capitalism 
The intent of the new taxi licensing by-laws was to create a regulated regime of owner-operator 
petty commodity/service production.  The adoption of a quota on licenses (commonly known as 
the medallion system) restricted entry, enabling license holders to gain an economic rent that 
otherwise would have been dissipated by competition, and the restrictions on dispatchers aimed 
to keep these rents in the hands of those directly providing taxi services.  Moreover, because taxi 
licenses were widely dispersed among small firms and individual owner-operators, it was 
anticipated that the rents would be widely shared.  Finally, price regulation protected customers 
against undue advantage taking by license holders.  But the regulations also permitted 
medallion owners to treat their licenses as private property, which could be sold, leased or 
devised,43  and this paved the way for the creation of a different mode of taxi cab capitalism, 
which I have dubbed “medallion capitalism.” 
 
We can begin the story of the development of medallion capitalism by examining the industry’s 
evolving social relations of production.  Under the medallion system employment in the taxi 
industry initially increased as workers seeking to become taxi drivers could not easily obtain a 
license and go into business for themselves.  For many, the only option was to become an 
employee of a license holder, who in any event had a strong incentive to keep the car on the road 
to maximize the revenue the license produced.  Since many drivers faced the prospect of 
remaining employees for several years until a medallion became available for purchase, they had 
a greater interest in engaging in collective action to improve their terms and conditions.  More 
generally, there was a high level of labour militancy at the end of the war as returning veterans 
and workers generally sought to share in the post-war prosperity and have a collective voice in 
workplace decision-making.  The adoption of the Wagner Act model of collective bargaining in 
Canada at the end of the war facilitated this desire through an administrative regime of 
compulsory union recognition coupled with a duty to bargain in good faith.   
 
Although the labour legislation embraced a highly fragmented model of enterprise bargaining, 
taxi unions in Toronto not only managed to organize drivers but to bargain on a broader basis.   
For example, in the late 1940s, Teamsters Local 488 bargained with the Federal Association of 
Taxi Cab Operators on behalf of 800 drivers employed by the Association’s 40 members and 
with the Diamond Taxi Cab Association on behalf of the 300 drivers of its members.  As a result, 
taxi unions were successful in securing improved terms and conditions for drivers.   
 
As the Union pressed for contract improvements in the early 1950s, medallion owners took steps 
to end employment in the taxi industry.  Instead of  hiring drivers as employees, medallion 
owners adopted a leasing system in which drivers leased the car on either a long or short-term 
basis, typically including dispatching services.  Drivers who rented taxis were either entitled to 
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keep a percentage of the fares or, more commonly, paid a fixed fee and kept the fares, but were 
responsible for fuel.  In part by push and perhaps in part by pull (the lure of being independent), 
the leasing system became so widespread that employment virtually disappeared and Local 488 
collapsed.44     
 
A second development that produced and shaped medallion capitalism was the departure of 
owner-operators, the intended beneficiaries of regulated petty commodity/service production, 
from the industry.  Driving a cab is hard work involving long hours and so owner-operators 
often looked for exit strategies.  As the value of licenses went up, some owner-operators cashed 
out, sometimes selling their medallions to drivers who replaced as owner-operators, but often 
selling medallions to small fleet owners looking to expand their operations.  Each medallion that 
went to a fleet owner reduced the number of owner-operators, and the movement was almost 
always in one direction.  Another exit strategy for owner-operators was to retain ownership of 
the medallion as an income-generating asset.  In this scenario, medallion operators stopped 
driving and became full-time rentiers by leasing it to other drivers or fleet owners.  Often the 
owner hired an agent was hired to manage the medallion on the owner’s behalf.  In fact, as we 
shall see, the use of agents became quite widespread.  The overall result of this process was that 
not only did the great majority of medallion owners become rentiers, but a second layer of 
rentiers was interposed between the medallion owner and the driver. 
 
A third change in the relations of production involved the growing role of taxi associations 
providing dispatch services.  With the development of radio, telephone dispatching was 
displaced, and new economies of scale became available.  Diamond Taxi was typical.  It was 
formed after the war by ten small fleet owners who collectively operated 200 cars.  By 1957 the 
number of medallions associated with the dispatch increased to 410.  Diamond Taxi operated as 
a branded fleet with all of its associated taxis painted in the same colours and carrying rooftop 
signs so that to the customer it would appear that Diamond Taxi was a single branded business.  
Diamond also developed corporate accounts, which provided a valuable and important source of 
fares at a time when credit card usage was not as widespread as it is today.45   
 
If these associations (or brokerages as they came to be known) remained cooperatives providing 
services to their members they would have been a barrier against, rather than an entry for 
rentier capitalism.  However, they became incorporated for-profit businesses that provided 
dispatching and other services to medallion owners and lessees who did not have ownership 
shares in the brokerage.  This created another layer of rentier capitalism, characterized by 
unequal power relations between the brokerages and the remaining owner-operators of single 
vehicles who contracted for their services.   
 
The structure and operation of the industry in the early 1990s was described in detail in two 
Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions from that period.46  There were about 3500 cab 
licenses in Toronto, half of which were held by an owner having one medallion.  The other half 
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were held by about 600 individuals or corporations that owned multiple licenses.  As well, there 
were 7000 licensed drivers who were not medallion owners.  However, as we noted, some 
medallion owners, including single owners, were not drivers, but rather leased out their 
medallions to another individual who operated the vehicle or appointed an agent, typically a 
principal of a brokerage, to manage the medallion on their behalf.   
 
The largest brokerage at the time was Diamond, which had 299 associates who collectively 
owned or leased 605 medallions.  Of these, 248 associates owned or leased a single medallion, 
while the remaining 51 associates owned or leased 357 medallions.  Only a small number of 
associates ran 10 or more medallions with Diamond, the largest associate having 39.47  Diamond 
was governed by a nine-member board of directors, almost all of whom were associates of the 
brokerage, and was managed by a president and vice president.  Although Diamond itself did 
not own any cabs, the president and vice president acted as designated agents for owners of 173 
medallions, giving them control of more than a quarter of the licensed vehicles operating under 
the Diamond banner.  Other brokerages had different structures, but the OLRB noted there were 
often personal, commercial or family connections between the larger associates who effectively 
controlled the brokerages.  As a result, medallion capitalism created opportunities for both 
rentier capitalists and an increasing concentration of ownership and control of medallions. 
 
Under these conditions, there were two principal groups from whom profits could be extracted: 
drivers who rented cars by the shift and owner-operators who either owned or leased a single 
medallion – and both groups organized to resist what they perceived to be their exploitation.  
Initially owner-operators and drivers were concerned with the disciplinary actions of the 
licensing authority, but by the 1960s they were becoming more focused on their relationship 
with the brokerages and/or the multiple medallion owners.  Access to protective employment 
law and collective bargaining, however, was impeded by their designation as self-employed, with 
little prospect of successfully challenging that status.48   
 
Operating from an industrial pluralist perspective, in 1965 Professor Harry Arthurs recognized 
the unfairness of depriving economically vulnerable individuals of access to industrial 
citizenship to redress unequal power relations, regardless of whether that vulnerability was 
created by the employment relationship or through commercial contracts.  He proposed that the 
law should recognize a category of “dependent contractors” who would be given access to the 
collective bargaining regime and specifically identified “taxicab operators” as a group that fit this 
category.49  Arthurs’ article opened a conceptual crack in the door to employee status, but it took 
years of struggle by taxi drivers and owner-operators to get through it.   
 
                                                        
47 Some medallion owners were associates of more than one brokerage; they associated some of their 
medallions with one brokerage and some with another brokerage. 
48 Berry, supra note 25 at 135-37. On the development of employment standards, see Mark Thomas, 
Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009). 
49 Harry W Arthurs, “The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing Power” 
(1965) 16:1 UTLJ 89 at 89. 
Drivers unsuccessfully attempted to unionize on several occasions in the 1960s.  In the early 
1970s, the Canada Labour Congress chartered the Toronto Union of Taxi Employees as a direct 
local and by 1972 it had 500 members.  Efforts to claim coverage under the recently enacted 
Employment Standards Act50 (ESA) failed when a court ruled that drivers were not employees, 
and talk of expanding the Act’s coverage in the Ministry of Labour came to naught.  However, in 
1975 the Ontario government amended the Labour Relations Act to include a dependent 
contractor provision, which gave employment status to a person who “whether or not employed 
under a contract of employment, and whether or not furnishing his own tools, 
vehicles…performs work or services for another person for compensation…on such terms and 
conditions that he is in a position of economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to 
perform duties for, that person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee than 
that of an independent contractor.”51  No similar provision was added to the ESA at the time or 
has been to this day. 
 
The dependent contractor provision clearly did not make all people in unequal economic 
relations employees.  For example, if taxi drivers entered into fuel supply contracts with 
companies in an oligopolistic supply industry the law would not transform them into fuel supply 
company employees simply because of unequal power relations and economic dependency.  
Exploitive relations of production in purely rentier capitalism were outside the scope of the law.  
So if all brokerages did was sell taxi drivers dispatch and related services, they could successfully 
argue this did not create a dependent contractor relationship for the purposes of the law, even if 
the taxi brokerages were able to extract value from the labour of the rental drivers and owner-
operators.   
 
However, the relationship between brokers and drivers went beyond merely selling dispatch and 
related services.  Taxi brokerages were branded businesses selling a product to the public, and to 
build and maintain their goodwill they were driven to impose contractual obligations on 
members and drivers in order to provide a more-or-less standardized product and to insure 
reasonably prompt service.  As well, the brokerages also needed to prevent drivers from gaming 
or cheating the dispatch.  The first goal was achieved primarily by requiring that associate’s 
vehicles have common colours and signs, and be kept clean.  As well, drivers were subject to 
dress and behaviour codes, with disciplinary measures available if the rules were violated.  The 
provision of prompt service and the prevention of gaming required the exercise of managerial 
controls related to the use of the dispatch service, such as prohibitions on booking into an area 
when not in it or while engaged in transporting a passenger or parcel and prohibitions on 
rejecting or failing to respond promptly to a fare offered by the dispatch, etc.  These rules were 
enforced by a system of sanctions.52   
 
These elements of control made it possible to argue that as a matter of law taxi drivers were 
dependent contractors of the dispatches, not merely the purchasers of dispatch services.  This is 
not the place to delve into a detailed analysis of the complex legal test of who is an employee or 
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dependent contractor,53  but it will be helpful to look at the legal complexity that Toronto taxi 
unions faced when they attempted to organize the industry in the 1990s.   
 
Although in the first case the OLRB rejected a claim by owner-operators that they were 
dependent contractors employed by brokerages, organizing drives continued, reflecting workers’ 
widespread dissatisfaction with how they were being incorporated into medallion capitalism. 
Eventually, one case was successful.54  The fight to unionize in Toronto was an extended one.  
The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) conducted an extensive 
organizing drive among drivers and individual owner-operators associated with nine different 
brokerages in the early 1990s, eventually filing simultaneous applications for certification, 
identifying the brokers as the employers.  Votes were held and the ballot boxes were sealed 
pending a determination of whether these workers were dependent contractors under the LRA.   
After a careful examination of the operation of the brokerages, the OLRB found that drivers and 
owner-operators “regularly and consistently derive a substantial portion of their income from a 
single entity which exercises detailed control over the performance of their work by means of an 
elaborate system of written and unwritten rules and disciplinary responses which effectively 
penalize anyone failing to meet its standards...”  The Board noted that although drivers could 
opt to work outside the dispatch system, “economic pressures substantially limit the exercise of 
those freedoms.”  It also recognized that while owner-operators were at liberty to change 
brokers, their freedom was no greater than the freedom of employees to change employers, a 
freedom that merely shifted their dependency from one broker to another, but did not alter the 
basic condition of dependency.55 
 
Having been found to be dependent contractors and therefore employees under the LRA, the 
ballot boxes were opened and in 1993 the Union was certified as the bargaining agent for the 
drivers and owner-operators of three of Toronto’s largest brokerages, Diamond, Co-op and 
Metro.  Negotiations took place in 1994 but were unsuccessful and the workers went on strike in 
August.  After three weeks of demonstrations and protest, leading to unfair labour practice 
claims and criminal charges, the parties agreed to have outstanding issues resolved by 
arbitration.  Part of the problem in negotiations was that some of the issues that needed to be 
resolved related directly to the rental and shift fees that associates charged drivers, a matter that 
was not governed by the brokerage’s rules.  To address this problem, the Union applied to have 
the members of the brokerage who owned or leased more than one medallion declared related 
employers in order to force them to the bargaining table.     
 
The arbitration was held before the related-employer application was heard, but to defend their 
interests, the association representing the small fleet owners associated with the brokerages 
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sought to intervene.  Although the arbitrator denied the fleet owners intervenor status, his 
award, issued in December 1994, identified them as parties to the agreement along with the 
Union and the brokerages.  However, the arbitrator refused to include a provision in the two-
year agreement regarding the rental and licensing fees charged by the associates. 
 
Hearings on the Union’s related-employer application began in 1995.  Ironically, previously 
sought to be represented in the arbitration proceedings, the associates now opposed the related-
employer application, presumably to avoid having their fees become subject to future collective 
negotiations.  To determine whether the associates and the brokers were related employers the 
OLRB had to consider whether they were carrying on associated activities under common 
control and direction.  The Board recognized that the fundamental goal of the related employer 
provision was to make collective bargaining viable in the face of organizational arrangements 
that fragmented the employer function, a situation that David Weil has since popularized as 
fissuring.56   
 
Based on an extensive analysis of the relationship between the brokerages and their associates, 
the Board found a high degree of functional integration, such that the drivers were dependent 
contractors of both and that there was common control and direction.  The brokerages exercised 
control over the associates through the associates’ dependency on their services, as well as 
through the brokerages’ control over the associates’ drivers, while the associates were found to 
exercise a degree of influence over the brokers, particularly the larger fleet owners who were 
often involved in running the brokerage.  In the result, the brokerages and their associates were 
found to be related employers and arrangements were made for them to be represented in future 
bargaining.57   
 
That future was short-lived.  The parties managed to negotiate a second collective agreement but 
could not resolve the issue of rental and lease fees, a matter that was vital to the determination 
of compensation for drivers and owner-operators who leased but did not own a plate.  As a 
result, by the end of the decade, the Union collapsed and collective bargaining and 
representation disappeared, a victim of the fragmented structure of the Toronto taxi industry 
and the unequal power relations it produced. 
 
The failure of taxi drivers and owner-operators to achieve industrial citizenship meant these 
workers were unable to gain a reasonable share of the rents produced by medallion capitalism, 
which were being captured by the various rentiers.58  A 1998 Task Force report found numerous 
problems in the taxi industry including the fact that transferability allowed absentee ownership 
of medallions to produce a layer of “middlemen.”  This structure was found to contribute to 
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“deplorable working conditions” exacerbated by “the redistribution of farebox revenues to non-
driving agents, lessees and owners.” 
 
In an effort to lessen the role of rentier capital in medallion capitalism, two key changes were 
made to the by-law in 1999 that aimed to recreate a regime of regulated petty commodity 
production by getting medallions back into the hands of drivers.  The first froze the number of 
medallions and placed limits on their transferability, while the second created a new 
“Ambassador” license that could only be held by a full-time licensed driver who was prohibited 
from hiring another driver and/or transferring the license in any way.59  
 
A preliminary report for an industry review prepared in 2012 found that these changes were 
partially successful in achieving their goal.  Ambassador licenses did create a new group of 
owner-operators who had higher incomes than shift drivers, although many resented the 
restrictions on their ability to hire drivers or lease the vehicle.60  Standard licenses, however, 
were not getting back into the hands of drivers because owners found various ways to avoid the 
transferability restrictions imposed in the by-law.  They had a strong incentive to do so as the 
market value of standard licenses was skyrocketing from about $80,000 in 1998 to $210,000 in 
2011.  The final report, issued in 2014, found that two-thirds of the nearly 3,500 standard taxi 
licenses were managed by agents and that the top 27 agents managed 1,113 medallions.61  
Despite the reforms, rentier capital retained a large place in the industry. 
 
To complete the transformation from medallion capitalism to regulated petty commodity 
production Toronto would have to move more aggressively to decommodify standard taxi 
licenses and get them into the hands of drivers, 62 and to retain restrictions on supply.  And here 
is where Uber comes in. 
 
Taxi Capitalism 5.0: Platform Capitalism Uber Style 
 
Uber is commonly referred to as a ridesharing company and as such part of the sharing 
economy.  But Uber drivers no more share their cars with passengers than traditional taxi 
drivers do; they both sell a transportation service.  Of course human interactions inevitably 
occur in these jointly occupied spaces and pleasant ones enhance the quality of the experience 
for the customer and add exchange value for the seller.  In fact, many workers, including taxi 
and Uber drivers may be required to perform affective labour as part of their jobs, whether for 
their own protection or to satisfy employer demands, obtain high ratings from customers or 
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earn tips, where tipping is permitted.63  The transactional context of these ‘sharing’ interactions 
makes it impossible to know whether one is experiencing authentic sociality or merely 
witnessing a good performance, and perhaps as consumers we don’t really care. 
 
A somewhat more accurate way to describe Uber is that it is a transportation network company 
(TNC) that provides intellectual property (a computer platform) to connect passengers with 
drivers who are paid to transport passengers from one location to another.  However, from a 
consumer perspective, Uber is functionally no different than a taxi dispatch service.  If I want a 
taxi, I telephone a dispatch (e.g. Diamond Taxi) which uses its technology to locate a driver in its 
network who is sent to pick me up and drive me to where I want to go, for which I pay a fare to 
the driver.  If I want an Uber, I use my Uber app, which is a technology that  locates a driver in 
Uber’s network who is sent to pick me up and drive me to where I want to go, for which I pay a 
fare through my app.  I may prefer Uber to taxi dispatch services because the app is cool and 
easier to use than making a phone call and paying the driver with cash or a credit card, or 
because Ubers arrive more promptly or are less expensive, etc., but the service is nonetheless 
functionally equivalent to a taxi dispatch.  They even use the same technology to transport the 
passenger – a car. 
 
We will return briefly to the question of the legal characterization of Uber, but first we want to 
look underneath the hood so to speak at its social relations of production.  At one level Uber 
might be characterized as a rentier capitalist selling a dispatch service to individual commodity 
producers, arguably much as like traditional taxi dispatch service claim.  On that reading, 
drivers with cars are just micro-entrepreneurs using their own labour and means of production 
to sell transportation services to the public.  The Uber app is merely a software platform that 
enables Uber drivers to reach that public, just as telephone and radio dispatch services enabled 
traditional taxi drivers to connect with customers.  Like radio dispatchers, Uber owns no cars 
and has no drivers on its payroll.  The technology is different but the functional relation between 
Uber and its drivers and radio dispatchers and their drivers is nearly identical.   
 
But to stop there would be to miss what happens beneath the surface.  Uber does more than 
simply sell dispatch services to drivers.  Just like taxi dispatches, it is also a brand and, 
therefore, is driven to impose additional obligations on its drivers to protect the brand by 
ensuring that certain service standards are met and that its network operates efficiently.  Of 
course there are differences between brands.  Taxi dispatches enhance their brands’ visibility by 
requiring cars to be painted in its colours and to have rooftop signs, while Uber prefers to 
operate with a look more akin to a black car service, without identifying signs.  But there is 
nothing fundamentally important about this difference. 
 
To achieve its goals of maintaining standards and efficiency, Uber exercises considerable control 
over its drivers.  Although Uber drivers are not required to book onto the service, once they do 
they are governed by Uber’s rules.  For example, when a fare is offered to a driver, the driver has 
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a very limited time to accept.  If the driver does not respond in time the fare is offered to another 
driver.  Drivers who decline too many trips may be forcibly logged off the app for a period of 
time.  The driver and the vehicle must meet quality standards set by Uber and are subject to 
customer reviews after each trip, and poor reviews can lead to deactivation.64  These controls 
sound remarkably similar to those imposed by traditional dispatches, which complicates Uber’s 
claim that functionally it is merely a rentier capitalist selling computer dispatch services to 
drivers.  And it is precisely these kinds of functional controls that make both traditional 
dispatches and Uber vulnerable to being legally classified as employer of the drivers in its 
network.  Indeed there is a rash of claims being brought by Uber drivers seeking employee 
status, whether for the purposes of collective representation or to gain the protection of 
minimum employment standards and growing legal academic commentary on whether Uber 
employees are or should be considered employees.65 
 
The argument that both from a consumer and a driver point of view Uber is functionally a 
dispatch that operates much along the same lines as traditional taxi dispatches, however, does 
not lead to the conclusion that it is a medallion capitalist.  To the contrary, Uber has disrupted 
medallion capitalism in a very important way: it operates without medallion capital and 
therefore threatens to destroy medallion capitalism.66  Uber recruits drivers who may not be 
licensed as taxi drivers and, more importantly, who do not own or lease a taxi license.  As a 
result, it by-passes municipal taxi regulation and, if it is successful, taxi licenses will either cease 
to have either a use or an exchange value or, at the very least, that value will be substantially 
diminished.67  In short, Uber’s major innovation is less a technological than a legal one. 
 
The avoidance of taxi regulation has important consequences for relations of production in the 
Uber model.  In medallion capitalism, relations of production are complex and multilayered.  
Dispatches sell services to medallion owners who in turn rent licensed vehicles to drivers 
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directly or through agents.  Uber provides dispatch services directly to owner-operators, thus 
cutting out medallion owners and their agents.  There are no intermediary rentiers between 
Uber and the driver. 
 
Whether Uber’s bold evasion of existing taxi regulations succeeds will depend on the regulators’ 
response.  In North America, this will be a municipal decision.  Toronto’s new by-law, which 
came into effect on 15 July 2016, legalized and lightly regulated Uber’s business model, while 
modifying standard taxi regulation by formally terminating its attempt to (re)create an owner-
operator model.  Limits on the number of taxi licenses remain, but Ambassador licenses were 
rolled over into standard licenses and limits on the accumulation of licenses by a single owner 
were ended.68  It remains to be seen how these changes will impact the future of medallion 
capitalism, but even if Uber’s success comes at its expense, it will not be the end of taxi 
capitalism.  Rather, we will have a new model of capitalism: platform facilitated petty 
commodity production by subordinated workers.  On one level, there will be thousands of so-
called micro-entrepreneurs selling taxi services through the Uber platform, but on another Uber 
drivers will be engaged in a dependent relationship characterized by unequal power relations 
that enable Uber to extract profit from their labour and petty capital.   
 
This dependency and inequality is not only a general characteristic of capitalist relations of 
production, but takes a specific form in platform capitalism.  Platforms are likely to be 
oligopolistic in their structure.  This is because to be successful, Uber or other platforms must 
make both ends of the market in the sense that they need to assemble large pools of sellers 
(drivers) and buyers (riders).  Network effects play an important role here.  The more numerous 
the users, the more valuable the platform becomes for both the users and the platform owner.  
According to Srnicek, “this generates a cycle whereby more users beget more users, which leads 
to platforms having a natural tendency towards monopolization.”69  As a result, being there first 
has a significant advantage, especially when the dominant player is also heavily capitalized and 
can lock in its initial advantage by subsidizing rides when necessary to keep competitors at bay.  
Indeed, many observers argue that Uber’s ambition, and the condition for its long-term success, 
is to establish itself as an unregulated monopoly provider.70  A related feature of platform 
facilitated petty commodity production is that unlike earlier versions which pitted drivers 
against local petty capitalists, here drivers face a heavily capitalized global corporation that has 
the wherewithal to withstand short-term losses as well as unmatched resources to lobby 
government. 
                                                        
68 City of Toronto, “Vehicle-for-Hire”, Toronto.ca (accessed 10 March 2017), online:  
<http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=b7d78b38956c5510VgnVCM10000071d60
f89RCRD>.   
69 Srnicek, supra note 6 at 45. 
70 Simon Harding, Milind Kandlikar & Sumeet Gulati, “Taxi Apps, Regulation, and the Market for Taxi 
Journeys” (2016) 88 Transportation Research Part A 15; Justin Fox, “Uber is Still Trying to Figure Out If 
It’s a Real Business”, Bloomberg View (29 August 2016), online: 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-29/uber-is-still-trying-to-figure-out-if-it-s-a-real-
business>; Yves Smith, “Can Uber Ever Deliver? Part Four: Understanding that Unregulated Monopoly 
Was Always Uber’s Central Objective”, naked capitalism (5 December 2016), online:  
<http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016/12/can-uber-ever-deliver-part-four-understanding-that-
unregulated-monopoly-was-always-ubers-central-objective.html#_ednref10>.  
 
Uber’s market power gives it the upper hand with its drivers, the petty service providers.  As a 
price maker, Uber sets the fare structure and then takes a commission.  It therefore exercises 
considerable control over what drivers can realistically earn.  Since its launch, Uber has cut 
fares, increased its commission from 20% to 25%, and tacked on a $1 safety fee.  Uber drivers 
are using their own cars and bear the cost of gas, maintenance, insurance and car depreciation.  
Although comparisons are not straightforward, one analyst estimates that Uber drivers make no 
more than taxi drivers.  Not surprisingly, researchers find that Uber drivers consistently 
complain about low income.71  Indeed, Uber drivers in numerous jurisdictions have alleged they 
are making less than the minimum wage.  As well, Uber’s claim that its drivers enjoy freedom 
and flexibility has been contradicted by the experience of its drivers.  “[T]he combination of 
blind passenger acceptance with low minimum fares and the algorithmic determination of surge 
pricing... reveal, respectively, how little control Uber drivers have over critical aspects of their 
work and how much control Uber has over the labor of its users (drivers).” 72  Finally, Uber’s 
platform technology gives it a level of surveillance and managerial control that was impossibly 
costly for traditional taxi brokerages.   
 
It is not surprising that Uber drivers have resisted what they perceive to be their exploitation in 
the same ways that other workers have historically.  Indeed, because the relation between 
drivers and Uber is more direct and unmediated by other layers of rentier capital than is the case 
in medallion capitalism, the obstacles to securing  labour and employment rights may be 
somewhat reduced.  Uber drivers have sought to be declared employees entitled to the 
protection of employment standards and eligible for unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation and other benefits for which employers must make contributions.  Many of these 
claims are still being litigated, but there have been some successes, including a 2016 decision in 
England by an employment tribunal that was scathing in its rejection of Uber’s arguments.  “Any 
organization…resorting in its documentation to fictions, twisted language and even brand new 
terminology, merits, we think, a degree of scepticism.” “[I]t seems to us that the Respondents’ 
general case and the written terms on which they rely do not correspond with the practical 
reality.  The notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a 
common ‘platform’ is to our minds faintly ridiculous.”73  In New York, Uber drivers have been 
ruled eligible for unemployment payments and workers’ compensation coverage.74  There is also 
a major class action law suit claiming that Uber has misclassified thousands of drivers in 
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California and Massachusetts, depriving them of minimum wages and hours of work 
protections.75 
 
Workers are also seeking to form unions in some locations.  In New York, the Amalgamated 
Transit Union collected close to 14,000 signed union cards from Uber and Lyft drivers, but in 
order to avoid the issue of employee status under the National Labor Relations Act, applied to 
the Taxi and Limousine Commission to hold a union election.76  The organizing drive occurred 
after Uber attempted to head off unionization by entering into an agreement with the 
Independent Drivers Guild, an organization affiliated with the International Association of 
Machinists, to represent its drivers in appeals of de-activations and in meetings with Uber, but 
without any authority to negotiate terms and conditions of employment or to strike.77   
 
It is too early to tell whether Uber drivers in platform-enabled petty commodity production will 
gain the protection of labour and employment law and whether, if they do, Uber will find ways 
to re-transform taxi capitalism to enable it to operate without having the obligations of an 
employer.  The important point for our purposes is that to talk sensibly about the future of 
platform capitalism in the taxi industry we must not only recognize that it is capitalist, but also 
understand the relations of production behind the app and the conflicts they generate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Platform capitalism Uber style is not the end of taxi capitalism history.  Changes in technology 
are part of the story, but so too is law and resistance.  Indeed it is fair to say that the 
development of taxi capitalism is driven by their interactions.  Medallion capitalism was made 
possible by law, but the law was a response to the actions of drivers and owner-operators unable 
to make a living in a regime of unregulated petty commodity production.  The development and 
spread of a new technology, radio dispatching, provided an opportunity for rentier capitalism to 
gain a foothold in the industry, but the shape of medallion capitalism was also driven by the 
conflict between drivers and dispatches and small fleet owners over how the value produced 
under medallion capitalism would be divided.  In order to avoid collective bargaining and keep 
more of the value for themselves, dispatches and fleet owners ended employment and turned 
drivers into contractors.  When labour law was eventually changed to address this reality, 
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drivers renewed their efforts to unionize as dependent contractors, but were ultimately defeated 
by the fissured relations in the industry.   
 
Uber has introduced a new technology and created an unmediated relation between itself and its 
drivers, whom it too treats as self-employed micro-entrepreneurs.  Yet here too law and 
resistance play an important role in shaping taxi cab capitalism Uber style.  Uber’s boldest 
innovation is its legal claim that it is not subject to existing taxi regulation.  Taxi regulation is 
being remade city by city, largely with the aim of creating a level playing field for both branches 
of the industry.  At the same time, Uber is facing resistance from its drivers who seek to retain 
more of the value they produce through collective bargaining and employment law.  It remains 
to be seen whether they will succeed and if they do how Uber will respond.  It is already 
investing heavily in the development of driverless cars, which would lead to a new model of 
capitalism or, perhaps, post-capitalism.78 
 
My argument is not that medallion capitalism is preferable to platform capitalism Uber style. 
Under either form of taxi capitalism the drivers who perform the work experience domination 
and exploitation.  So while technological change may open up possibilities for transformation, as 
long as the technology is deployed for the purposes of maximizing profits for the benefit of its 
owners, its emancipatory potential is unlikely to be realized.  Capitalism is not a platform on 
which a sharing economy can be built.  
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